Accompanying the new sense of national pride brought about by rapid economic growth is the rise of the so-called “Chinese special theory.” While emphasizing the differences between China and other countries, it gives the current system a legal cloak that is “in line with national conditions,” thereby rejecting structural reforms in basic theory. At the same time, it exaggerates the “incomprehensibility” of Chinese culture to foreigners and refuses to accept dissection and criticism of itself by people outside the Chinese cultural circle. In any case, the theory of “China Special” constitutes one of the pillars of “xenophobia” as mentioned by Li Kanru, and it has opened the door for some conservatives to “work behind closed doors”**.

No matter which country or nation it is, it must have the common characteristics of all mankind that all countries or nations have, and also have characteristics that other countries or nations do not possess. This is the basic proposition of Marxist philosophy. In this sense, a scholar born in the United States, whose cultural customs and social structure are different from China’s, will inevitably have the unique insights of an “onlooker” who escape from China’s inherent concepts in his observations and interpretations of China, as well as inevitable misunderstandings due to language or cultural barriers. Therefore, “Governing China: From Revolution to Reform” written by Kanru Lee, a well-known expert on China issues in the United States who once held an important public position in the White House, is not a “foreigner’s work” that can be laughed off.

The Chinese version of “Governing China” was published in 2010. At that time, China was in the “golden age” of sustained economic growth, continuous improvement of social welfare, and relatively open politics. The gratifying results of reform and opening up made countless Chinese people full of confidence in the future. However, most people did not expect that just nine years later, the evil consequences of China’s system that had been accumulated for many years would begin to show. Today, faced with a series of problems at home and abroad, people are once again as confused as they were in the early 1990s. And the more it is at this time, the more we need to absorb the nutrients of “outsiders”. We might as well open this book, which was published more than 20 years ago, and see how Americans at that time viewed China’s historical development in the past century.

This book has 11 chapters in total. The first part roughly sorts out the overall characteristics of the Chinese imperial era and the history of the Republic of China. The second part introduces the history of the Republic since 1949 and discusses the governance issues faced by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Chinese leaders in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Detailed analysis; the third part introduces in detail the operation model and decision-making process of China’s current political system; the fourth part analyzes the challenges that the Chinese model will face in the future and possible solutions from the perspectives of economic development, environmental protection and social governance.[①]

This article will combine the author’s own understanding of Chinese politics and culture, starting from the two perspectives of “insight” and “misreading”, to analyze the viewpoints in this book that are worthy of attention or discussion. “Articles convey the truth” has always been highly praised by Chinese intellectuals, so the analysis in this article inevitably incorporates the author’s own value judgment.

This is the so-called imperial tradition of “external Confucianism and internal law”. Its core is actually “internal law”, and “Confucianism” as a mere outer layer can be replaced by any other thought. No matter how hard the rulers try to package it, the cruel nature of the empire will not change just because of the change in appearance. On the one hand, Li Kanru realized that “Although Confucianism was the official ideology for most of the two thousand years of Chinese history, in practice it adopted a large number of legalist ideas.” On the other hand, he attributed the imperial model of “students obey their teachers, children obey their parents, subordinates obey their superiors, and everyone respects the emperor” to the influence of “Confucianism.” He mistakenly attributed China’s “feudal ethics” to the “influence of Confucianism” while ignoring the essence of imperial China’s “external Confucianism and internal law”.

The modern representative democracy in the West originated from the feudal system in the Middle Ages[③]. In this strictly hierarchical system, social concerns ranged from near to far, thus giving rise to the political principle of “the vassals of my vassals are not my vassals.” This system of allocating rights and obligations based on closeness and distance in social relationships coincides with the “cultivation of Qi and peace” advocated by Confucianism. The effective operation of representative democracy must be based on a community of acquaintances and local consciousness, which is precisely the natural extension of the European feudal system and Confucianism that also originated in the feudal system environment of the Western Zhou Dynasty. If “internal law” constitutes the core principle of the imperial system, then “external Confucianism” contains the foundation of the modern democratic system.

When imperial China, which had been closed off for a long time, began to passively come into direct contact with Western civilization, those Chinese who were the first to “open their eyes to see the world” were keenly aware that the social system generally followed by Westerners was highly similar to the social system envisioned in the Confucian classics they had studied with great concentration for many years. They described Western society as an ideal state in which “the top and bottom are of one mind, conduct themselves according to etiquette, and take care of the world’s affairs[④]”, and summarized the basic principles of this ideal society as “the world is for the common good.” Therefore, for a considerable period of time in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China, those intellectuals who would later be called “conservatives” were inspired by the commonalities between the democratic system and Confucian classics and began to reflect on the cruel imperial system. The reason why they were called “conservatives” by later generations of activists was precisely because they only opposed “internal law” and not “foreign Confucianism”, thus giving people the impression of “defenders of feudal ethics”.After the “May 4th” New Culture Movement, under the combined influence of a series of complex factors at home and abroad, the “progressive ideological trend” of “anti-foreign Confucianism” began to become the mainstream of China’s ideological circles. This was exactly what Mr. Li Zehou called a turning point in which “salvation overcame enlightenment.” However, what may overwhelm “enlightenment” may not be “saving the nation”, but “internal law” packaged in modernity. In sharp contrast to Confucianism, which advocated “differentiated love” and valued social relationships between near and far, Legalism advocated “undifferentiated obedience”, aiming to break the inherent social network of feudal society and closely unite atomized individuals around the ruler[⑤]. The “progressive trend of thought” regards the highly centralized nationalism of Germany and Japan as a shortcut to China’s modernization, and then shifts from “learning from Britain and the United States” to “learning from Britain and the United States through Germany and Japan” so that China will not fall too far behind in the Spencer-style “national competition”. Rather than saying that China after the May 4th Movement was one in which “national salvation prevailed over enlightenment,” it would be better to say that “internal law prevailed over foreign Confucianism,” and “Germany and Japan prevailed over Britain and the United States.”

As Li Kanru described in his book, the Kuomintang founded by Sun Yat-sen after the Second Revolution was a highly centralized “Leninist party”, while the Communist Party, which developed almost at the same time as the Kuomintang, also had a Leninist organizational style and “had similar social and political origins”**. Therefore, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have been practitioners of the “progressive trend of thought” since the “May Fourth Movement”, but they have serious differences on the approach to realizing modernization.

“Elite” and “Masses”: Sharp Confrontation between Two Revolutionary Subjects

The victory of the Soviet-Russian October Revolution provided the “progressive ideological trend” after the “May 4th Movement” with a new path to modernization that was different from that of Germany and Japan. Li Kanru believes that ***Marxism, as a “‘scientific’ and ‘progressive’ Western theory that predicts the collapse of the Western capitalist system in revolutionary changes,” allowed some intellectuals at the time to see the possibility of “quickly bringing China into the ranks of the vanguard of civilization defined by this theory.” With the help of the Comintern, these intellectuals formed the Communist Party of China.

Unlike Germany and Japan, which mainly promoted reform or revolution through the middle and upper classes, the main body of the socialist revolution in Soviet Russia was workers, farmers and grassroots soldiers who were widely mobilized. Li Dazhao called the victory of this revolution “the victory of the common people”[⑥]. The premise of the German-Japanese “elite revolution” is that there is a large-scale emerging aristocratic group in the country where the revolution occurs. These new aristocrats not only have social resources at their disposal that are sufficient to promote social revolution, but they are also dissatisfied with the old system. For countries like imperial Russia and imperial China, where the capitalist economy is not yet mature and the emerging aristocracy has not yet formed a revolutionary force, the German-Japanese-style elite approach may not be applicable.

The early founders of the Communist Party were aware of this. Since China at the end of the Qing Dynasty had not yet formed a bourgeoisie of a certain scale, after the success of the Revolution of 1911, the revolutionary party quickly lost control of the new regime. Although Sun Yat-sen did build an armed force after returning to Guangzhou, the success of the Northern Expedition was also inseparable from his mass line of “alliance with Russia and the Communist Party” and the reality of the separatist rule of the Chinese warlords in the north.The right-wing camp of the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek did not agree with the Communist Party’s mass revolutionary method. They insisted on following the German-Japanese elitist line. The conflict between the two sides broke out after the death of Sun Yat-sen, who suffered almost all casualties in the “Purge Party” campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek. It was the late 1920s, when emerging powers such as Germany and Japan were rapidly sliding towards fascism and militarism. Influenced by this trend of thought, Chiang Kai-shek began to advocate the “New Life Movement” and parted ways with the Communist Party, which advocated a mass revolutionary line. Although the “New Life Movement” has the appearance of Confucianism and Christianity, its essence is to use political high pressure to cultivate the habit of obedience among citizens. This is still a replica of imperial China’s “external Confucianism and internal law”[⑦] . In this sense, China’s modernization process has never been truly completed.

Li Kanru attributed the Kuomintang’s ultimate defeat to “three ills deeply rooted in traditional Chinese political culture”, namely “nepotism, corruption and all talk but no action.” This actually underestimates the Chinese people’s tolerance for the imperial system and the appeal of the “mass revolution” line pursued by the Communist Party. Although the Communist Party’s land policy was briefly relaxed during the Anti-Japanese War, its land revolutionary movement, which widely mobilized lower-level farmers to “attack local tyrants and divide their fields,” did effectively incorporate the peasant group, which accounted for the majority of China’s population at that time, into its own revolutionary activities. By the end of the Liberation War, China at that time had no power to resist the “revolutionary social changes of the Communist Party.”

“Orthodoxy” and “National Conditions”: Differences between the Two Revolutionary Lines and the Turbulent Thirty Years

As early as the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, there were differences within the Communist Party regarding the revolutionary line: On one side were the “orthodox Marxists” headed by representatives of the Comintern and intellectuals with overseas study background in the party. They advocated using industrial workers as the main body of the revolution, seizing power through urban riots, and ultimately establishing a proletarian society. The government of class dictatorship; on the other side are the “Marxists based on national conditions” headed by China’s local farmers and traditional intellectuals. They advocate using farmers as the main body of the revolution, seizing power through peasant wars, and ultimately establishing a coalition government jointly led by the progressive class[⑧] . Although the two sides reached an agreement on correcting the “right capitulationism” of Chen Duxiu and others after Chiang Kai-shek launched the “April 12” coup, differences within the party regarding the revolutionary line have always existed. It was not until the “Orthodox faction”’s wrong command caused the entire party to suffer heavy losses in the fifth “Counter Encirclement and Suppression Campaign” and the “National Conditions faction” gained the main leadership in the party that the differences came to an end temporarily.

However, as Li Kanru said, the peasant line of the Communist Party’s “national conditions faction” made it possible that when the Communist Party seized power in 1949, “the vast majority of party members were composed of farmers.” These people “instinctively tended to oppose the cities and intellectuals.” They were “unable to master the paper work characteristic of large-scale administrations, but gained the power to occupy high positions in the political institutions that governed the country”. It was this unsuccessful transition from revolutionist to ruler that ultimately led to the historical upheaval of the first thirty years of the Republic.As the leader of the “national conditions faction” and even the entire Communist Party, Mao Zedong also had the problem of “role reversal” mentioned above. Li Kanru believed that ** as a successful revolutionary, Mao Zedong “must maintain a high degree of enthusiasm”, which was “difficult to be compatible with smooth administrative management”. Revolutionaries “tend to see complex management as an obstacle to the achievement of their goals”, while civil servants “often have to throw a damper on the enthusiasm and lack of technical expertise that underlie revolutionaries’ decision-making impulses”. It was this long-standing tension between revolutionary leaders and the bureaucracy that forced Mao Zedong to use his “philosophy of struggle[⑨]” again and again to confront the bureaucracy he had established himself. And it was this “cyclical battle against its own creation” that left the Communist leaders who took over power in 1976 with a “country exhausted by social conflict” and a “government system in which mutual distrust and factional strife have become irreversible”.

In the turbulent thirty years at the beginning of the founding of the Republic, the technocrats represented by Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai objectively played a certain role in restricting Mao Zedong. Because of this, they have always been regarded by Mao as part of the “rotten and backward” bureaucracy, and they have been constantly suppressed in the power struggle. It was not until the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976 that Deng Xiaoping gradually came to the center of power and started the reform process of “rectifying chaos.” Although during the same period, debates about the reform route reappeared within the party, Deng Xiaoping relied on his extraordinary political skills to balance the forces of all parties and lead a confused China onto a “pragmatic” development path.

“Politics” and “Economy”: Advancement and Stagnation of Institutional Reform

In Li Kanru’s words, the reforms in the 1980s were a process of “first taking bold actions, then trying to adapt to the results and trying our best to move forward.” The main target of reform is the political and economic system based on Mao Zedong’s principles of egalitarianism and collectivism. It began in the ideological field, that is, “flexibly applying Mao Zedong Thought” to “liberate China from the shackles of dogmatism” [⑩]; it reached its peak in the economic field, saving the Chinese economy from the verge of collapse in Mao Zedong’s late period; and finally ended in the political field.

Although most people attribute China’s reforms in the 1980s to Deng Xiaoping, the “chief architect of reform”, it was Hu Yaobang, the “chief engineer of reform”, and Zhao Ziyang, who succeeded him, who actually promoted reforms at the policy level. Fierce debates about the reform route accompanied almost the entire reform process in the 1980s. On one side of the debate were the “enlightened factions” represented by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were “convinced that more fundamental changes must be made in order to establish a more humane political system and market economy”; on the other side were the “conservatives” headed by the older generation of revolutionaries, who “eager to restore the time before a series of ’left’ radicalism”**.The “political turmoil at the turn of spring and summer” in 1989 announced the end of this debate that had lasted for many years. The “enlightened faction” completely lost the right to speak within the party, and the reform stalled for a time. Fortunately, Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Talk” restarted the process of economic system reform and put the confused party and country on the road to the development of a “market economy.” The new round of institutional reforms that began in the early 1990s built the government’s legitimacy on the principle of “performanceism,” that is, all institutional reforms must serve to improve economic efficiency. This strategy has been effective until recently, with China’s economy growing at an average annual rate of nearly 10%. However, the long-term stagnation of political system reform has also cast a shadow over the deepening of economic system reform and China’s long-term development.

In 2012, former Premier Wen Jiabao called at the National People’s Congress press conference: “Without the success of political reform, economic reform cannot be carried out to the end. [⑪]” This statement pointed out a fundamental problem facing China today. Li Kanru analyzed the challenges that China will face in the economy, environmental protection and society from the perspective of the political system. The core crux is a series of fundamental contradictions that exist in China’s political system.

“Governing China” was written in the 1990s, more than 20 years ago. Although China has undergone tremendous changes in the past two decades, the fundamental problem of stagnant political system reform has not been resolved. In this sense, Li Kanru’s book is not completely outdated. As mentioned above, Li Kanru’s understanding of modern Chinese history has both insights and misunderstandings. What our generation needs to do is to carefully eliminate the misunderstood parts and absorb the parts of its insights.

In 2019, China is facing changes unprecedented in decades. At this historical turning point, we must carry out reform and opening up to the end with an open mind and a humble attitude. China’s land and people have suffered endless suffering for thousands of years. We cannot allow the painful history to repeat itself, and we cannot allow the reverse trend of the “Cultural Revolution” to occur again.

[①] Li Kanru. Governing China: From Revolution to Reform[M]. China Social Sciences Press, 2010.

[②] Xiong Yi. Spring and Autumn Days: Imperial Power and Academics in the Traditional Chinese Context[M]. Shaanxi Normal University Press, 2007.

[③] The “feudal system” here only refers to the social system of “feudal states and founding states”, not the “feudal period” as a historical form commonly referred to by Chinese academic circles, the same below.

[④] Liu Xihong. Private Notes of Yingjin[M]. Yuelu Publishing House, 1986.

[⑤] Qin Hui. “Greater Community Orientation” and Traditional Chinese Society (Part 2)[D]. Social Science Research, 1999.

[⑥] Li Dazhao. The victory of the common people[J]. New Youth, 1918, 5(5): 436-4.

[⑦] Liu Wennan. Disciplining Daily Life: The New Life Movement and the Governance of Modern Countries[J]. Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy. Humanities. Social Sciences, 2013 (5): 89-102.

[⑧] Mao Zedong. On Coalition Government[M]. Green Apple Data Center, 2013.

[⑨] In his book, Li Kanru summarized the characteristics of Mao Zedong Thought as follows: ideological leadership, theory of the will of the people, opposition to intellectuals, contradiction analysis, and good use of mass movements.

[⑩] What this mainly refers to is “the discussion on the standard of truth.”[⑪] Frontline Reporting Team of People’s Daily Online. Wen Jiabao: Without the success of political reform, economic reform cannot be carried out to the end[EB/OL] People’s Daily, 2012.